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ABSTRACT 
The Navy detailing process is complicated and detailers spend 
many hours trying to assign sailors to jobs. There are many factors to be 
considered for each job assignment: sailors' preferences (detailing), 
commands' requirements (placement) and the numerous policies that 
affect both sailors and commands, manning priority levels etc. Often this 
process is fraught with subjectivities, as each resultant job assignment 
will vary, depending on the detailer making the assignment. 
It is therefore timely to explore another way of doing business: a 2- 
sided matching process that considers sailors' preferences and 
commands' requirements and assigns sailors to jobs in an equitable and 
fair manner. This new process is better able to cope with the complexities 
of job detailing and other additional information requirements. 
This thesis compares the differences between the current detailing 
system and a 2-sided matching process, and presents the advantages of 
adopting the latter. This new way of doing business brings about major 
benefits for large organizations such as the Navy. 
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I.        INTRODUCTION 
A.       OBJECTIVES 
The Navy Personnel Command assigns over 100,000 Sailors 
annually using in excess of 200 Detailers. Detailers try to strike a 
balance between the commands' needs and the Sailors' preferences, 
which is inherently difficult to achieve. The current process utilizes the 
hierarchical planning method and unfortunately, this centralized labor- 
intensive detailing method leaves many stakeholders (e.g. Sailors, 
detailers, and commands) discontent and frustrated. In some instances, 
Sailors have chosen to separate from the Navy rather than accept 
undesirable orders, further decreasing retention rates. By the same 
token, some commands have been forced to receive less qualified Sailors 
to avoid vacancies in key positions, reducing mission effectiveness. The 
current Navy enlisted detailing process may be enhanced by a review of 
the actual detailing process. A new way of detailing could include the use 
of a 2-sided matching algorithm to match sailors to available jobs. 
Sailors could be given some form of control by ranking their preference 
over available jobs for their next rotation of jobs before applying for them. 
Commands could also rank their preference of certain attributes that 
they are looking out for in sailors in their list of available jobs. The 2- 
sided matching process can then perform a job match to assign sailors to 
jobs. This matching process may yield a higher level of utility for both 
sailors and commands, compared to the current detailing system. Some 
form of this is already present in the JASS system today. 
Advances in Information Technology (IT) developments facilitate 
this form of electronic employment in large organizations. Large cost 
savings could result by removing the human element out of the loop. In 
addition, subjectivities on the part of the human detailers are eliminated. 
The detailing process could be more efficient and equitable using web- 
based markets and intelligent agents to assist Sailors and commands in 
finding one another in a distributed, electronic system. An electronic 
detailing system has the potential to enhance the various stakeholders' 
satisfaction through better job matching methods. Developing an 
electronic detailing system that will satisfy the needs of all stakeholders 
requires an intimate understanding of the current detailing process's 
positive and negative aspects. Knowing stakeholders' satisfactions and 
dissatisfactions with the current process will facilitate designing and 
executing a superior electronic detailing process. 
The purpose of this research is to examine the limitations of job 
matching in the Navy, and to design an economics experiment to 
demonstrate the potential for an electronic employment market. 
B.       RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. The Primary Research Question Is: 
What form of electronic employment market can be designed for a 
military organization that will satisfy both sailor's preferences and the 
Commands' requirements? 
2. Supporting Or Secondary Research Questions Include: 
(1) How are personnel detailed in the USN, what are the 
limitations of this process, and how do these limitations affect 
enlisted personnel assignments? 
(2) How can an agent-based electronic market help optimize job 
matching? 
(3) What economics experiments can demonstrate the outcomes 
expected in both the current and proposed job-matching process? 
(4) Based on the economics experiments, what advantages does 
electronic job matching offer enlisted sailors, commands and 
detailers? 
(5)      How   will   using   an   agent-based   electronic   employment 
market benefit both the organization and the individual? 
SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
The scope includes: 
(1) A literature and document review of the current Navy 
enlisted detailing process. 
(2) Phone/personal interviews and PowerPoint reviews 
delineating steps within and flow of the current Navy enlisted 
detailing process. 
(3) A review of survey data and PowerPoint briefings concerning 
Sailors' satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the current detailing 
process. 
(4) Analysis of the current Navy enlisted detailing process to 
identify positive aspects that should be incorporated into a new 
web-based detailing system. 
(5) Identifying the a few key attributes that are deemed 
important to both Sailors and Commands to be included in the 
design of the new detailing model. 
(6) Formulating an economics experiment using the identified 
key attributes and performing this experiment on a group of 
personnel. 
2. Limitations 
Although every attempt was made to gather the most accurate data 
for the current Navy enlisted detailing process, there is neither a formal 
system to collect this information nor is there a way to gather only 
objective data; much of the information comes directly or indirectly from 
subjective interviews and briefings. 
The design of this economics experiment is a simple and crude 
model to examine the feasibility of applying this new concept to the 
complicated process of detailing. There is no way to ascertain whether 
this concept will be bought in the first place. A major paradigm shift in 
thinking in the Navy needs to be accompanied by this new concept of 
detailing to enhance success. 
3.       Assumptions 
This thesis assumes that the reader has a general knowledge of the 
current Navy enlisted detailing process. The reader is not expected to 
know the specific process, but it is assumed that the reader has some 
knowledge about the detailing system so that common acronyms and 
verbiage are not confusing. 
D.  METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this research includes the following 
steps: 
1. Conduct literature and Internet searches of books, magazine 
articles, PowerPoint briefings, and library information databases. 
2. Identify the key attributes for use in the new system via 
phone and/or personal interviews with EPMAC and other agencies. 
3. Design and conduct an economics experiment using the few 
identified key attributes. 
4. Analyze the results of the new detailing process and compare 
with the current system. 
5. Determine implications for the new future system. 
ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter II will cover the current detailing process adopted by the 
US Navy. In addition, the strengths and shortcomings will be 
analyzed. 
Chapter III will be the design and conduct of the new economics 
experiment, taking into account the identified key attributes. 
Chapter IV will be the analysis of the results achieved from the 
conduct of the new economics experiment. 
Chapter V draws final conclusions from the experiments conducted 
and recommend topics for future research. 
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H.  BACKGROUND - OVERVIEW OF THE EMPLOYMENT MARKETS 
A.       LABOR MARKET ECONOMICS 
Market-based approaches to employee/employer matching rely on 
the interaction of labor demand and supply, and what is now textbook 
understanding of labor market economics (Ehrenberg and Smith 1997). 
On the demand side of the labor market are employers; while on the 
supply side of the market are workers and potential workers. The forces 
of demand and supply heavily influence the wage that prevails in a 
particular labor market. 
The demand curve is typically downward sloping. Firms combine 
various factors of production - mainly capital and labor - to produce 
goods or services that are sold in a product market. Their total output 
and the combination of capital and labor depend on three forces - 
product demand, the amount of labor and capital they can acquire at 
given prices, and the choice of technologies available to them. When the 
wage is high, it is likely that the potential return per dollar invested in 
capital will be higher than labor. Thus the firm will continue to invest 
more in capital than labor until the equilibrium in return per dollar 
invested is reached. Thus at one end, high wages typically correspond to 
lower labor demand. On the other hand, should the wage be cheaper, 
the potential return per dollar invested in labor will yield higher return 
than capital. The logical firm will then invest more in labor, and less in 
capital. Thus lower wages will usually result in higher demand for labor. 
The market demand curve indicates how many workers the firm will be 
willing to hire at each wage level, holding all other variables (such as 
capital costs) constant1. 
1
 It is important to distinguish between a shift in a demand curve and movement along a curve. When the 
wage changes and other forces are held constant, one moves along the curve. However, when one of the 
other forces changes, the labor demand curve shifts. For example, the costs of capital decreases, the 
substitution effect will cause the labor demand curve to shift left, i.e. overall lowered demand for labor at 
any given wage point. On the other hand, lowered capital costs could also result in lower product pricing, 
thereby leading to higher demand. This scaling effect could potentially shift the labor demand curve right, 
i.e. higher demand for labor at any given wage point. How the demand curve shifts will depend on the 
juxtaposition of these two market forces. 
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The labor supply curve is usually upward sloping. If the wages in 
the other occupations are held constant, and the wages in our study 
market rise, we will expect more people to be willing to enter this market 
as their opportunity costs of not joining this market become higher due 
to the relative improvement in compensation. Therefore, when the wages 
are low, we expect to see a low labor supply (these are the enthusiastic 
people who really enjoy working in this particular environment), while 
high wages will usually result in a high labor supply (these are the people 
attracted to join the market due to better compensation relative to their 
other choices). The market supply curve indicates how many workers 
would enter the market at each wage level, holding the wages in other 
occupations constant. 
The point where the labor demand and supply curve intersect is 
known as the market-clearing wage or market equilibrium wage. Figure 1 
illustrates labor demand and supply curves for a representative labor 
market. The wage rate in this market tends towards its equilibrium 
value denoted by W*. The quantity of labor that employers are willing to 
hire at this wage rate exactly equals the quantity of labor that employees 
willingly supply (L*). Anyone that wants to work in the industry can find 






Quantity of Labor 
Figure 1: Market-Based Labor Markets 
If the wage rate is below the equilibrium W*, demand for labor will 
exceed supply. At this point, employers will be competing for the few 
workers in the market and a shortage of workers will exist. The desire of 
the firms to attract more employees would lead them to increase their 
wage offers, thus driving up the overall level of wage offers in the market 
(upward pressure on wage rate towards W*). 
As the wage rises, two things will happen. First, more workers will 
choose to enter the market and look for jobs (a movement upwards along 
the supply curve), and second, increasing wages would induce employers 
to seek fewer workers (movement downwards along the demand curve). 
If wages rise over W, the supply will exceed demand. Employers will 
desire fewer workers than the numbers available. This will result in 
excess in supply. Employers soon realize that they can fill their positions 
with lower wages as eager applicants look for jobs. Some will be happy 
to accept the jobs at the lower wage rate, while others will leave the 
market (thereby movement downwards along the supply curve). Again, 
the forces of the market will tend to drive the wage towards the 
equilibrium wage W*. 
A subtle but important aspect of equilibrium wage rates involves 
job amenities such as work environment, geographic location, commute, 
promotion potential, work content/challenge, and job satisfaction etc. In 
weighing employment benefits in one industry relative to alternative time 
uses (leisure and other jobs), job amenities are important considerations. 
If job amenities are particularly attractive in one industry, individuals 
will supply labor to that industry at relatively low wage rates; if job 
amenities are unpleasant, labor is only supplied at relatively high wage 
rates (Ehrenberg and Smith 1997). This is referred to as compensating 
wage differentials. For example, an engineer is likely to be paid more if 
he is required to perform arduous field work in third world countries 
versus his counterpart with the same qualifications in a comfortable 
office close to home. Holding other characteristics constant, individuals 
willing to work in an industry for relatively low wages either derive high 
utility from agreeable job amenities (e.g. flexible hours for a spouse with 
children), or are relatively weakly deterred by objectionable job amenities 
(e.g. a fit young adventurous individual working as a forest ranger). 
Market-based labor markets balance demand and supply, ensuring 
equality between the quantities of labor demanded and supplied. To 
operate efficiently, employees must have complete information about 
relevant job opportunities, including salary, benefits and job amenities. 
To mimic the results of market-based labor markets, alternative labor 
market mechanisms must both balance demand and supply, and 
promote demand and supply efficiencies. To ensure demand and supply 
efficiency, labor assignments must reflect labor's relative value in 
alternative uses, employee capabilities and job preferences. 
With regards to labor assignments, there are currently two modes 
prevailing in the matching people with jobs: 1) hierarchical planning and 
2) distributed markets. Each has strengths and limitations, which will 
be discussed in the following sections. 
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1.       Hierarchical Labor Market 
Hierarchical labor markets assign individuals to jobs using a 
centralized process. Such assignments rely on administrative 
procedures to match individual capabilities and job requirements and to 
reflect both the job's relative priority and the individual's job preferences. 
There is no mechanism to automatically strike a balance between supply 
and demand efficiencies, as in market-based labor markets. At one 
extreme, employers can assign individuals to jobs with little regards to 
personal preferences. Employees can either accept the assignment or 
find another alternative occupation. This approach emphasizes the 
employer's performance (demand efficiency) at the expense of employee 
morale (supply efficiency). At the other extreme, employers can 
emphasize individual job preferences relative to job priority and the 
match between employee skills and job requirements. This emphasizes 
employee morale at the expense of employer performance. Criticisms 
against hierarchical labor markets concern their inability to ensure 
demand and supply efficiencies, inherent equilibrium conditions in 
market-based labor markets. This inability reflects both information 
requirements and asymmetric incentives (profits vs. morale). 
Demand and supply efficiencies are particularly important for 
closed systems with a constrained labor supply. In the military, wages 
are uniform across jobs requiring similar skills and experience (no 
compensating wages). As a result, the cost of assigning labor to one use 
is the loss of output in the best alternative unfilled use for that labor 
(opportunity cost); salaries and benefits are irrelevant in measuring labor 
costs. If labor assignments don't maximize demand and supply 
efficiencies, the system wastes resources by applying them to less 
valuable jobs, and reduces job satisfaction, morale and retention, by 
assigning labor to jobs that are relatively less desirable with no 
compensating wage differential. 
The Department of Navy (DoN) uses a centralized, hierarchical 
labor market to match enlisted sailors jobs.   On the demand side, Navy 
commands identify open positions.     Job vacancies are compared to 
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projections of available personnel. Typically, the number of positions to 
be filled exceeds the supply of available personnel. Therefore, the Navy- 
develops a Navy Manning Plan (NMP) that spreads the labor shortage 
across all commands, on a "fair-share" basis. The Navy then prioritizes 
job vacancies based on each command's mission, current staffing levels, 
and several other relevant characteristics. This process attempts to 
distinguish between high and low valued demands for labor, to mimic 
demand efficiency in market-based economy. 
On the supply side, available personnel are categorized according 
to their qualifications (ratings), including skills, experience, 
education/training, career path, etc. Similar skill groups are arranged in 
communities (e.g. electronics, supply, machinists). Each community has 
a detailer charged with matching personnel to jobs. Sailors seeking job 
assignments can express their personal preferences to the detailer. The 
detailer is responsive to job vacancy priority ratings, but there is some 
room for discretion in tailoring job assignments to meet the sailors' 
personal preferences (supply efficiency). Supply efficiency is subordinate 
to demand efficiency in this process. 
DoN's hierarchical labor market is further complicated because 
enlisted sailors change jobs every two to three years. Thus, the 
centralized detailing process reassigns between one third and one half of 
the enlisted force every year. This adds a time dimension to this process 
that is more critical than in typical civilian markets. The Navy begins 
identifying job vacancies and available personnel as early as nine months 
in advance. Time also affects the job vacancy priority rating. More 
imminent vacancies receive a higher priority than similar but more 
distant vacancies. 
DoN fills billets (i.e. jobs) according to a predetermined priority 
ranking until the labor supply is exhausted, and demand efficiency is 
emphasized over supply efficiency.     In market-based labor markets, 
equilibrium wage rates automatically performs functions; wages adjust 
until there is no excess supply or demand for labor, and employees 
voluntarily choose their preferred job, considering both relative wages 
12 
(compensating wage rates) and job amenities. In DoN's hierarchical labor 
market, wage rates do not increase to limit the demand for labor to the 
available supply, so commanders are frustrated they can't fill vacant 
positions. Similarly, wages do not adjust across job assignments to 
account for job amenities, and assignments do not fully incorporate the 
sailor's job preferences. Predictably, both commanders and enlisted 
sailors voice dissatisfaction with the current hierarchical labor market. 
2.       Distributed Markets - Two-Sided Matching Markets 
A market-based approach supports unrestricted, point-to-point 
matching between potential employees and outside employers. In this 
scenario, the potential for problematic information overload can be high, 
and employee turnover incessant. 
Unlike fast-paced IT firms in Silicon Valley, wage rates for military 
personnel are set by fiat and adjust very slowly to supply- or demand- 
driven pressures. At least in the short term, DoN cannot rely on spot 
labor markets for filling its key jobs with qualified people. Indeed, 
without its current, hierarchical detailing system, the Navy would find it 
very difficult to fill many of its important jobs. Yet the Navy could also 
benefit from the efficiencies associated with market-based systems. A 
two-sided matching market assigns individuals to jobs when there are 
several possible employers and employees. The matching algorithm 
balances the employers' and employees' preferences, but it can produce 
assignments that give priority to either employers or employees. As such, 
the algorithm specifically addresses both demand and supply efficiency. 
Unlike hierarchical systems, matching markets balance both employers' 
and employees' preferences. This effectively matches job requirements 
and employee capabilities, and systematically helps obviate many supply 
side problems, including employee dissatisfaction, low morale and 
retention. This improves both demand and supply efficiency relative to 
hierarchical labor markets. Two-sided matching markets also are 
responsive enough to keep pace with the extreme periodic job rotations 
effected routinely by the Navy.    But such matching markets lack the 
automatic   dynamic   response   of   market-based   systems,    and   the 
13 
opportunity for side agreements that circumvent the system can be 
administratively cumbersome. Unlike market-based systems, two sided 
matching markets provide some centralized control through the 
clearinghouse, and periodic matching can dampen the high rates of 
employee turnover now experienced in high technology industries. 
The balance between demand and supply preferences depend on 
the matching algorithm. It is important that the matching process 
recognize job priorities, a function performed by detailers in DoN's 
hierarchical process. 
In our thesis, our focus will primarily be on, the design of an 
economics experiment that can demonstrate the differences between the 
current system and the agent based two-sided matching systems. These 
results can be used to analyze and evaluate the potential benefits and 
limitations of using a two-side matching algorithm in assigning DoN 
personnel. 
B.        OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT NAVY ENLISTED DETAILING 
PROCESS 
1.        Organization Structure 
The Navy's Manpower, Personnel, and Training processes include 
Manpower Requirements, Manpower r^ogramming, Personnel Planning 
and Personnel Distribution. This thesis will concentrate on the 
Personnel Distribution process, specifically the Enlisted Distribution 
System (EDS). The EDS consists of a distribution triad: allocation, 

















Figure 2: From: Manpower, Personnel, & Training PowerPoint Brief, From CDR Bill Hatch, 16 
May 2000 
The overall distribution goal is to ensure what is commonly 
referred to as the "four rights" or "R4:" the right Sailor with the right 
training occupying the right billet at the right time. The focus in this 
thesis will be on the assignment process within the distribution triad, 
which is commonly called "detailing", for active duty enlisted Sailors. 
The allocation process initially separates distributable and non- 
distributable personnel inventory. Distributable inventory includes 
everyone who is not a student or in a Transient, Patient, Prisoner, or 
Holdee (TPPH) status. Students also referred to as Awaiting Instruction 
(AI) and TPPH personnel are non-distributable and are included in the 

















Figure 3: From: Manpower, Personnel, & Training PowerPoint Brief, From CDR Bill 
Hatch, 16 May 2000 
The four Manning Control Authorities (MCAs) are then apportioned 
distributable inventory in accordance with Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) priorities. The four MCAs include Commander in Chief, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet (CPF); Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CLF); 
Commander, Navy Personnel Command (CNPC); and Commander, Naval 
Reserve Forces (CNRF). The CNO and MCAs establish priority manning 
for distributable inventory. Allocation, placement, and assignment of 
distributable inventory are depicted in Figure 4 below. Each level of 
distribution is discussed in further detail following the chart. 
16 
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Figure 4: From: Manpower, Personnel, & Training PowerPoint Brief, From CDR Bill 
Hatch, 16 May 2000 
From Figure 4 above, the three distribution levels for distributable 
inventory are clear. The allocation process apportions distributable 
inventory to the four MCAs based on CNO priorities. Then, the 
placement process ensures that command needs are addressed. Finally, 
the assignment process considers the Sailors' preferences. These 
processes are further explained. 
CNPC is involved with the allocation process. It is organized into 
different branches or departments, commonly referred to as Personnel or 
"Pers" codes. The Distribution Management, Allocation, Resources and 
Procedures department (Pers 45) is responsible for allocation supervision 
and ensures a prioritized balance of distributable personnel to both sea 
and shore activities. Pers 45 personnel use the Enlisted Distributable 
Projections System (EDPROJ), a computer program which measures 
current strength against current billets for statistical purposes,  and 
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measures the projected strength nine months in the future against the 
projected billet time frame. EDPROJ receives data from two information 
systems, the Total Force Manpower Management System (TFFMS) and 
the Enlisted Master File (EMF), to determine where available personnel 
should be assigned to ensure equitable allocation among CNO priorities 
and the four MCAs. 
Pers 45 uses EDPROJ to measure current strength versus current 
billets and projected strength versus projected billets in the next nine 
months. The CNO determines CNO priority manning (Priority 1/2), 
which is transferred to EDPROJ to ensure that these priorities are 
accounted for before any other allocations are made. This resulting 
information is transferred from Pers 45 to the Enlisted Placement 
Management Center (EPMAC).  (Hatch) 
EPMAC uses the projected personnel from EDPROJ, coupled with 
MCA's prioritization manning algorithms and billet information from 
TFMMS to establish Navy Manning Planning (NMP) levels. NMP equitably 
distributes the projected personnel by rate (i.e. E3, E6, E9); rating (i.e. 
ABF, PN, EN); and Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) code across all 
activities to ensure each command receives its "fair share" of 
distributable personnel. Distributing the projected enlisted inventory 
equitably across the four MCAs, EPMAC's goal as the command advocate 
is to ensure the right person with the proper occupational skills occupies 
the right billet on time. 
The MCAs communicate with EPMAC to ensure that activities have 
the personnel they need to accomplish their missions.  Depending on the 
command's operational schedule, special circumstances, or additional 
considerations, MCAs can adjust requisition priorities to meet individual 
command personnel needs.   When activities need to increase manning 
above their NMP level for specific mission accomplishment, MCAs may 
designate   Priority   3   manning   requisitions   within   their   areas   of 
responsibility.   Priority 3 requisitions are valid for up to one year, and 
they  are  automatically  cancelled  on  30  September,  unless  another 
specific  date is  authorized.     Designating a requisition as Priority 3 
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indicates that the billet has a higher priority than other requisitions, but 
Priority 3 requisitions are not as high priority as the CNO Priority 1 and 
2 requisitions. Requisition priorities are an important consideration 
during the assignment process. During the assignment process, Sailors 
are selected and assigned, commonly called "detailing," into high priority 
billets based on NMP. In other words, the assignment process matches 
"faces" with "spaces." "Faces" result from scheduled rotation or 
availability whereas "spaces" occur when the command has fewer 
projected assigned personnel than the NMP, producing a "requisition." 
Requisitions are generated in the Enlisted Personnel Requisition 
System (EPRES) information system when a command's projected 
manning in a particular rating and rate (pay grade) falls below the 
projected NMP levels. The requisitions are then downloaded into the 
computer-based Enlisted Assignment Information System (EAIS), where 
the assignment officer, referred to as the detailer, can review them. 
Requisitions appear in priority order with the number one requisition 
being the highest priority billet to fill. CNO Priority 1 and 2 requisitions 
will appear at the top of the list immediately followed by the MCA Priority 
3 requisitions. 
The detailer represents the Sailors, or faces, in the Enlisted 
Distribution System. The detailer's goal is to cost effectively match 
Sailors with the necessary skill sets to the prioritized requisitions. 
Detailers employ EAIS to accomplish their difficult task of assigning 
available personnel to priority requisitions. Detailers view distributable 
inventory Sailors in EAIS nine months before completing their current 
tour of duty, i.e., their Projected Rotation Date (PRD). Non-distributable 
Sailors in the IA (students and TPPH) also appear in EAIS nine months 
prior to their PRD. 
Once detailers have selected a Sailor for a particular requisition, 
they access the Orders Writing Screen (OM) to begin the order writing 
process.    Once orders are electronically assigned, before actual orders 
are written, EPMAC reviews those orders for personnel E6 and above for 
quality of fit.   EPMAC has the authority to veto preliminary assignments 
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between detailers and petty officers first class and above. This ensures 
that the detailers' assignment best matches Sailors to jobs. EPMAC 
placement specialists can veto orders that fail to meet fleet readiness 
manning and balance, even if the orders are exactly what the E6 or above 
Sailor requested. EPMAC provides a sanity check on orders to ensure 
the fleet receives the Sailor it needs. Once approved by EPMAC, if 
applicable, the Sailor receives written orders. Essentially, the allocation, 
placement, and assignment processes work in concert to meet the Navy's 
readiness priorities. 
2.        Navy Assignment From A Micro Perspective 
The Navy's centralized system to reassign personnel among 
different duty types has two objectives. First, the assignment system 
must optimize readiness and stability for both afloat and ashore 
activities. Secondly, the assignment system must provide equal 
opportunity for personnel to serve in their desired duty. In theory, the 
task appears rather simple; in practice, balancing the Navy's needs with 
the Sailor's desires involves complex, time-consuming tradeoffs often 
requiring the Sailor to either accommodate or acquiesce one or more 
facets of their desired job assignment. Sailors may have to accept a 
different type duty, location, billet, or ship than they originally preferred. 
Detailers rely on myriad information systems as well as personal 
rating knowledge to direct personnel into prioritized, available billets. 
EAIS, which displays requisitions by priority, is their primary 
information system. If personnel require tiaining en route to their new 
command, detailers use the Navy Training Reservation System (NTRS) 
database to obtain class quotas and ensure requisite training is 
accomplished.  (Hatch) 
Currently, there is no single tool to help the detailers "mentally 
juggle" diverse policies, procedures, and information to ensure that the 
right Sailor with the necessary occupational skills is assigned to the right 
job on time. Detailer decisions, primarily subjective, may not always 
result in the best match for the Navy and/or the Sailor.   Detailers must 
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consider numerous, often changing, policies and procedures 
promulgated by the DoD, CNO, MCA, and CNPC when matching 
personnel to billets. (Cunningham, Hatch) Furthermore, Sailors have 
their own unique preferences, goals, and personal needs that detailers 
must consider. Detailers continually struggle to manage the Navy's 
requirements and the Sailor's wishes. 
The detailer's primary consideration is whether the Sailor 
possesses the occupational skill set the billet requires. This 
consideration must be balanced with the detailer's next concern: 
conserving Permanent Change of Station (PCS), or transfer, funds. 
Detailers must minimize monetary expenditures yet maximize the 
effective use of personnel abilities and qualifications. To assist with this 
tasking, detailers can review Sailor's qualifications in EAIS. EAIS will 
give the detailers pertinent information for reassignment decisions such 
as number of dependents, NECs, End of Active Obligated Service (EAOS) 
date, Projected Rotation Date (PRD), current duty station and assignment 
history or Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores, which are used 
to determine reassignments. 
Detailers also take into account spreadsheets containing the 
average PCS expenditures based on the Sailor's pay grade, location, and 
number of dependents. Detailers tenaciously match Sailors to jobs to 
the best of their ability. Their job is made more difficult because EAIS is 
only about 80 percent correct in characterizing service members' skills 
and the average PCS expenditures are only updated biennially. (Detailer 
Interviews) 
If the Sailor does not possess the billet's required skill level, 
detailers may consider training alternatives. Depending on class quota 
availability and tiaining expenditure levels, the detailer can offer the 
constituent training en route. Using NTRS, the detailer immediately 
reserves the Sailor's quota; ensuring required training is accomplished 
prior to the member's arrival at the new command. 
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Detailers must also maintain fleet balance by ensuring that 
enlisted personnel are equitably distributed to all activities among the 
MCAs by rate, rating, and NEC in proportion to the Enlisted Master File 
(EMF) delineated by the NMP. The requisition's priority and gapped 
billets require detailer's focus to ensure that priority-designated jobs are 
filled first and that face-to-face turnover occurs whenever possible. 
Acting as career counselors, detailers must advocate various duty 
assignments for service members. Detailers must ensure that personnel 
have the opportunity for advancement experience and rating excellence, 
and that they equitably share any existing hardship duty. Other factors 
requiring the detailer's attention are the member's Projected Rotation 
Date (PRD) and sea/shore rotation cycle. When considering personnel 
for overseas assignments, detailers must also follow Congressional policy 
which states that active duty members may not be assigned on land 
outside the United States or its territories and possessions, until they 
have had twelve weeks of basic training or its equivalent. Therefore, 
detailers can assign new enlistees overseas only after their initial basic 
training. 
For personnel who have family members in primary or secondary 
school, detailers attempt to schedule transfers during school breaks, to 
minimize school schedule disruption as practicable. Additionally, 
military couples must be co-located if at all possible. Gender is another 
factor requiring the detailer's careful attention; females must be near 
adequate medical treatment facilities during pregnancy and females have 
fewer potential duty assignments (e.g. no female billets are available on 
submarines or Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) billets and certain ships are 
not configured for female Sailors). 
Given these considerations, balancing the Sailor's desires with the 
Navy's priorities requires the detailer's meticulous attention and genuine 
concern.      Sailors'   personal   concerns  include   such  items   as  home 
ownership, spouses' careers, children's stability, and location preference. 
Each is a valid concern that detailers should address.   Furthermore, an 
entire detailing division is dedicated to handling service members' special 
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assignments such as Humanitarian Assignments (HUMS) or Exceptional 
Family Member (EFM) personnel. Currently, approximately 294 enlisted 
detailers manage nearly 330,000 Sailors' careers.  (Cunningham) 
To improve decision-making efficiency and effectiveness, the Job 
Advertising and Selection System (JASS) was developed. JASS is an on- 
line information and decision support system for Sailors, Command 
Career Counselors (CCCs), and detailers. At their convenience, Sailors 
around the world view and apply for the posted prioritized billets. Prior 
to JASS, Sailors had to negotiate with detailers via the telephone. This 
first-come, first-serve process forced Sailors to make hasty decisions over 
the phone and compelled detailers to assign personnel to billets when 
they were not the "best qualified" or least costly move. Furthermore, 
Sailors assigned to ships, remote locations, or night shifts often did not 
have the opportunity to contact their detailers for jobs upon initial 
opening. (Burlingame) As a result, they often got "stuck" with less 
desirable billets. These Sailors were frustrated by their disadvantaged 
position. In short, the Navy's priorities and Sailor's desires were not 
optimized before JASS was introduced in 1995. 
JASS permits Sailors to view jobs available in their pay grade and 
rating or Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) code.   Inconvenient phone 
calls to the detailers and snap decisions without family involvement are 
minimized. View-only JASS, available via Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) 
Access, allows Sailors to see, but not apply for, all available jobs in the 
current requisition.    Any service member, enlisted or officer can use 
view-only JASS to see the available jobs by rate,  rating,  and NEC. 
(Burlingame) With this initiative, Sailors can go on-line in the comfort of 
their homes or workstations to explore available jobs.   Sailors can see 
available  positions,   research  alternatives,   and  discuss   options  with 
family.     Ultimately,  this information system allows Sailors to make 
informed,  sagacious decisions regarding their next duty assignment. 
Only   Command   Career   Counselors,   or   those   designated   by   their 
Commanding Officer as career counselors, have the access to make job 
applications.   Command Career Counselors are involved for two reasons. 
First, they ensure that the Sailors are eligible and qualified for the 
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positions to which they are applying. Secondly, Command Career 
Counselors are fully engaged in the advisory role for Sailors' careers. 
View-only JASS offers Sailors flexibility and convenience. 
Command Career Counselors aboard naval vessels use JASS 
Client. They download bi-monthly data for the latest information cycle 
and jobs available. Using the ship's Standard Automated Logistics Tool 
Set (SALTS) via International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) 
communication capabilities, the CCC can download the most recent 
JASS information, including the latest requisitions, via File Transfer 
Protocol (FTP) program. The Command Career Counselor then works off- 
line with JASS Client, assisting Sailors with their job applications. 
Before the end of the application cycle, usually five days, the Command 
Career Counselor uploads all Sailors' billet applications for their 
detailers' review. Currently, WEB JASS is being introduced as an 
improved tool for Command Career Counselors. (Burlingame) This 
simplifies their access to JASS information by allowing downloads and 
uploads directly from the Internet, to ships or stations with Internet 
access. 
Using JASS Client or WEB JASS, the Command Career Counselor 
helps Sailors apply for up to five different jobs in preference order during 
a two-week requisition cycle. Because Sailors only have approximately 
five days to submit applications to the detailer before requisitions close, 
Sailors at sea, in remote locations, or working odd shifts have the 
opportunity to apply for the same jobs to which shore Sailors 
conveniently apply. No longer is the detailing process a first-come, first- 
serve assignment process. Detailing involves batch processing, thereby 
leveling the playing field for all Sailors.  (Burlingame; Hatch) 
When requisitions close, detailers spend approximately four days 
reviewing constituents' desires and matching the best-qualified person to 
the available positions based on the Navy's needs and the Sailor's desires 
and/or qualifications. Allowing batch-process detailing, JASS ensures a 
greater probability of efficient, effective Sailor-to-job pairing.    Once a 
Sailor is assigned to an available position and new requisitions are 
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uploaded from NMP, the detailer releases new billets on JASS, restarting 
the two-week cycle. 
One drawback to JASS is that Sailors expect to be assigned to their 
number one billet application, even though they apply for up to five 
different jobs. Frequently Sailors are not selected for their most 
preferred job, so detailers receive numerous phone calls or emails from 
disgruntled constituents requesting explanations and/or 
recommendations. (Marquez, O'Brien) At the beginning of every two- 
week requisition cycle, the detailers can expect to answer these phone 
calls or emails. Detailers can give Sailors career advice on steps to make 
them more marketable for their desired positions. 
Despite some disadvantages, JASS is generally advantageous for 
detailers as well. Detailers have the highest level of JASS access. They 
can view jobs, apply for jobs, and select Sailors to fill jobs. Since JASS in 
not compatible with EAIS, detailers must laboriously hand-transfer 
information from JASS into EAIS, and vice versa. On the other hand, 
JASS allows detailers to concentrate on actual assignments because it 
eliminates initial phone calls requesting available billet information. In 
addition, detailers can now select the "best qualified" Sailor for the job 
from several applicants rather than the first person who is able to 
contact the detailer, benefiting both the Navy and the Sailor. Helping 
detailers optimize the Navy's priorities and grant Sailor's desires, JASS is 
a step toward connecting detailers, Command Career Counselors, and 
Sailors in this ever increasingly automated world. 
3.        The Need For Alternative Approach 
The Navy must ameliorate the cumbersome, random detailing 
process to create incentives for junior and senior Sailors to remain in the 
Navy. In recent years, the civilian unemployment rate has declined to 
four percent, a 30-year low. First-term Navy attrition approached 40 
percent in 1998-1999, the highest in history. (Moniz "Military Uses Net") 
Considering the booming economy and the potentially disruptive military 
life, we must take steps to ensure that people are not leaving the military 
25 
in search of alternative occupations. The Navy's centralized, labor- 
intensive detailing process often disappoints its Navy customers, 
including both commands and Sailors. In addition, the detailing process 
is such a significant factor in Sailors' careers that it may potentially 
reduce Sailor morale and retention. If left unchecked, a deficient 
detailing process could lead to Sailors' substandard performance and 
poor fleet readiness. (Gates) Sailors today expect fast answers and quick 
explanations for why they were not selected for the first-choice job or 
what their next career-enhancing move should be. 
The Navy-wide Personnel Survey found that approximately 78% of 
enlisted Sailors have full-time employed spouses, a significant increase 
from previous years. (Kantor 1990-1997; Olmsted) In many instances, 
the spouse's career provides a larger family income than the Sailor's 
career. Thus, the Navy must allow and, indeed, encourage continued 
spousal employment by assisting Sailors to accommodate their spouse's 
career. Otherwise, assignment may have a direct bearing on whether 
Sailors decide to continue their Navy career.  (McGrath) 
A common complaint among Sailors using JASS is that their 
Command Career Counselor is not readily available to assist them with 
career advice or job applications. Very often Sailors resort to the former 
method of telephoning their detailer to get the perceived "inside scoop." 
Furthermore, despite being able to view available jobs on JASS, Sailors 
believe they will receive better or different job options by directly 
contacting the detailer. (Detailer Questionnaires; Holden; O'Brien) 
The Enlisted Distribution System may wish to examine lessons 
learned from the Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC), which 
now employs online recruiting to enlist new troops.   CNRC is meeting 
Generation Y on its own turf, the Internet, and the military's recruiting 
targets are being met.    Vice Admiral Ryan, Chief of Naval Personnel, 
recently commented that cyber-recruiting could be more effective than 
the old method of stalking malls and high schools for enlistees.   (Moniz 
"Military Engaged")    The detailing process must follow suit and start 
offering job searches and selections via the Internet.    Although not 
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problem free, JASS is an excellent first step, but needs to go further to 
balance the Navy's needs and the Sailor's desires. 
Two-sided matching labor markets offer the potential to address 
these concerns experienced by the commanders and the sailors. This 
thesis will focus on the design and use of economics experiments to 
demonstrate the current system of job detailing and examine the 
potential benefits and limitations of applying agent-based two-sided 
matching to DoN's hierarchical labor market. 
C.       INTELLIGENT AGENT TECHNOLOGY 
1.        A Classical Algorithm For Stable Marriage 
In the article by Irving, Leather and Gusfield, they discussed an 
algorithm that can be employed to achieve stable marriage matching of 
sample size n. A stable matching is a complete matching of men and 
women such that no man and woman who are not partners both prefer 
each other to their actual partners under the matching. 
In an instance of the stable marriage problem, each n men and n 
women lists the members of the opposite sex in order of preference. Gale 
and Shapely gave an efficient algorithm for finding such a match. This 
classical algorithm normally yields what is called the male optimal 
solution, with the property that every man has the best partner that he 
can have in any stable marriage. If applied with the roles of men and 
women interchanged, the algorithm will yield the female optimal solution, 
which similarly favors the women. The achievement of best possible 
partners by the members of one sex results in the members of the 
opposite sex having their worst possible partners. 
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Figure 5: Male and Female Preference Lists 
The classical algorithm for a solution to a stable marriage instance is 
based on a sequence of "proposals" from the men to the women. Each 
man proposes, in order, to the women on his preference list, pausing 
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when a woman agrees to consider his proposal, but continuing if a 
proposal is either immediately or subsequently rejected. When a woman 
receives a proposal, she rejects it if she already holds a better proposal, 
but otherwise agrees to hold it for consideration, simultaneously 
rejecting any poorer proposal that she may currently hold. (A "better" 
proposal means a proposal from some man higher in the woman's 
preference list.) 
Hence after first round, it can be seen from the example in Fig 5, 
men [2] and [7] would have been rejected by the first woman on their 
preference list. The match [2,6] and [7,7] are considered unstable 
matches and shaded gray. Men [2] and [7] will now propose to the women 
second on their preference list, highlighted in white. 3 scenarios can 
happen: 
(1) Women accept proposals, rejecting proposals they held 
earlier from other men. The other man would have to "move on" 
and propose to the woman in second choice. The process of 
proposal is repeated again for the rejected men. 
(2) Women reject the proposals from men [2] & [7].    The 
unstable matches would be shaded gray and the men move on to 
propose to the women next on their list. 
(3) Women accept the proposal, with no prior proposal from 
other men. The process represents a stable match when nobody 
gets rejected. 
The process is repeated until all matches are stable. In this 
example, the stable match scenario occurs when men [2] & [7] propose to 
their second choice women. 
Thus, it can be shown that the sequence of proposals will result in 
every woman holding a unique proposal, and that the proposals held 
constitute a stable matching (A similar outcome results if the roles of 
males and females are reversed,  in which case the resulting stable 
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matching may or may not be the same as that obtained from the male 
proposal sequence). Two fundamental implications of this initial 
proposal sequence are: 
(1) If m proposes to w, then there is no stable matching in which 
m has a better partner than w; 
(2) If w receives a proposal from m, then there is no stable 
matching in which w has a worse partner than m. 
These observations suggest that we should explicitly remove m 
from w's list, and w from m's, if w receives a proposal from someone she 
likes better than m. These are shaded in gray in the example in Fig. 5 and 
the resulting list is called the shortlist (male-oriented) for the given 
problem instance, with the following properties: 
(1) If w does not appear on m's shortlist, then there is no stable 
matching in which m and w are partners. 
(2) W appears on m's shortlist if and only if m appears on w's, 
and is first on m's shortlist if and only if m is last on w's. 
(3) If every man is paired with the first woman on his shortlist, 
then the resulting match is stable; it is called the male optimal 
solution, for no man can have a better partner than he does in this 
matching, and indeed no woman can have a worse one. 
(4) If the roles of males and females are interchanged, and if 
every woman is paired with the first man on her (female-oriented) 
shortlist, then the resulting matching is stable; this would be a 
female optimal solution, for no woman can have a better partner 
than she does in this matching, and indeed no man can have a 
worse stable match. 
2.        Relevance To This Thesis 
The classical algorithm will be the matching algorithm used in the 
economics experiment for matching between the sailors and different 
commands.  As in the illustration above, the current assignment system 
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can be mimicked by replacing the males with commands, and females 
with sailors available for assignment. This will result in a command 
biased match, reflecting the current detailing process where detailers try- 
to assign sailors to prioritized jobs while considering the sailor's 
preferences. Our thesis will attempt to demonstrate the potential 
difference in the utility function between sailors-biased and command- 
biased match achieved in the current detailing system and the possibility 
of improving these utility figures when increasing the batch size of 
available sailors to be assigned for jobs. 
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HI.     DESIGNING THE ECONOMICS EXPERIMENT 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
The design of the economics experiment to simulate the current 
detailing system went through a several rounds of iteration. In its final 
version, only 2 attributes were considered in the ranking of sailors' 
preference of job. Similarly, only 2 attributes were considered from the 
commands' perspective to rank their choice of sailors for the jobs 
available. From the earlier rounds of the economics experiments, it was 
assessed that an average human detailer could only cope with this level 
of details in assigning sailors to jobs. The detailers would be overloaded 
with information if there were more than two preference attributes. The 
arrangement and presentation of attributes of command and sailor 
preference also went through several rounds of iteration, to facilitate 
absorption of information by the detailers (experiment subjects). The 
abbreviations and wordings were also changed several times to ensure 
that they were termed as closely as possible to those used in the detailing 
community. 
The command-preferred attributes used in the actual experiment 
are NEC Training Level and Sailor's Past Performance while the sailor- 
preferred attributes are Sailor's Preferred Location and Promotion 
Prospects of the Job. Different preference levels were randomly generated 
and assigned to each of these attributes for both commands and sailors 
for the experiments. In conducting the experiment, detailers were allowed 
to assign sailors to jobs using their own standard of criteria. 
In addition, the economics experiments on job assignment were 
conducted in varying sailor batch size and job availability. This was to 
simulate scenarios where sailors needing a new job reach the detailers as 
a batch. The detailers had to assign jobs to each batch before the next 
batch arrived. It was anticipated that higher overall utility could be 
derived with a larger sailor batch size than with smaller sailor batch size. 
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Similarly, a larger available pool of job was expected to naturally result 
an overall better job match than with a smaller pool of jobs. 
Appendix A is the sailors' and commands' profile and Appendix B 
is the detailed set of experimental instructions that was used to conduct 
the economics experiments. 
B.       EXPLANATION OF UTILITY FUNCTION USED IN THE 
ECONOMICS EXPERIMENT 
Preference List Algorithm 
The sailor's individual utility is given by the Cobb Douglas utility 
function: 
aP & TO:, Us =BPIUp *LUspL 
Where: 
Us      = Utility of sailor 
BPI0^ = Sailor's derived utility from promotion prospects of billet 
L«SPL = Sailor's derived utility from fit between sailor's preferred 
location (SPL) and actual billet location (BL) 
OCp     +     OSPL   = 1 
Sailor's derived utility from promotion prospects of billet. More 
demanding and high profile billets are likely to be more challenging to 
the sailors, and competent sailors who manage the job are more likely to 
be noticed and ranked higher. This elevates their chances for promotion 
and career advancement. This is captured by the Billet Promotion Index 
(BPI) of each requisition billet, ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 being the 
highest and 1 being the lowest chance of promotion on the job. How 
much utility a sailor derives from a billet that is likely to boost his career 
advancement and promotion prospects will depend on his weight ocp. 
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Sailor's derived utility from fit between sailor's preferred location 
and billet location. Sailors specify their preferred location by the index 
SPL. The billets specify their location by the index BL. If there is a 
match between SPL and BL, the Location Index L will be assigned the 
value of 5, otherwise L will be less than 5, as shown in the table below. 
The sailor will thus derive a higher level of utility for a successful location 
match. How much utility he derives from the match will depend on how 
much weight he assigned to location fit, specified by CCSPL. 
Preferred 
Location 
Billet Location Location Index (L) 
LANTCONUS LANT Non-CONUS 3 
PAC CONUS 2 
PAC Non-CONUS 1 
LANTNon- 
CONUS 
LANT CONUS 3 
PAC CONUS 1 
PAC Non-CONUS 2 
PAC CONUS PAC Non-CONUS 3 
LANT CONUS 2 
LANT Non-CONUS 1 
PAC Non- 
CONUS 
PAC CONUS 3 
LANT CONUS 1 
LANT Non-CONUS 2 
The agent will calculate the Us each billet provides to each sailor, 
and rank profile the billets for each sailor based on decreasing Us. This 
is the Sailor's Preference List. 
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= Utility of command 
= Command's derived utility on getting sailor of the 
desired trained level. 
= Command's derived utility on getting a sailor of a 
higher performance rating. 
ßTL     +     ßsPI     = 1 
SPI^SPI 
Command's derived utility on getting sailor of the desired training 
level. Commands want to be assigned a sailor whose training level STL 
matches or is higher than the requirement of its billet BTL. If there is a 
perfect match between STL and BTL (i.e. STL >= BTL), the matched TL 
will be assigned a value of 5. Further deviations between STL and BTL 
will yield lower values of TL. 
STL < BTL TL 
One level down 3.75 
Two level down 2.50 
Three level down 1.25 
Having determined the value of TL for every eligible sailor for a 
particular billet, the agent then calculates the utility derived from a 
training level match. How much utility a command derives from training 
level matching will depend on the command's weight to training level 
matching, (3TL. 
Command's   derived   utility  from   getting  a  sailor   of a   higher 
performance rating.     Some commands will derive a higher utility from 
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being assigned a sailor with a higher performance rating than others. 
The rating of sailor's performance ranges from 1 (not promote) to 5 (early 
promote). The command's derived utility will depend on how much 
weight the command has assigned to ßspi. 
Sailor Performance SPI 
Early Promote 5 
Must Promote 3.75 
Promote 2.5 
Not Promote 1.25 
C.   COMPUTER MATCHING ALGORITHM 
The flow of the computer-matching algorithm is shown in the 
diagram below. There are two types of algorithms available, namely sailor 
or command biased. The former will yield greater utility for the sailors on 
the whole while the latter will produce greater aggregate utility for the 
commands. There are many instances whereby both the sailor and 
command-biased algorithm would produce the same outcome but the 
explanation of such phenomena is outside the scope of this thesis study. 
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COMPUTER MATCHING ALGORITHM 
Generate list of sailors 
Agent creates sailors' preference list 
based on 
Us= BP!0" 1°^ 
where 
U5 = utility of sailor 
BPr0^ = return on promotion prospects 
V = return on location 
Sumofa=1 
Generate list of jobs in Command 
Agent creates commands' preference 
list based on 
UC=TLF- SPIpSP1 P 
where 
Uc = utility of command 
TLpu = return on matched training 
level 
SPIPSPI = return on performance rating 
Sumofß = 1 
Agent runs matching algorithm 
to create optimal solutions: 
Optimal solutions based on: 
a) Sailor preference (max 10 
b) Command preference (max 14) 
where Ut = {ßUs + (1-ß)Uc 
and 0<ß<1  
ß = 0 corresponds to command bias 
ß=1 corresponds to sailor bias 
This investigates how the matching might 
change according to the preference and 
priority of USN. 
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1. Sailor-Biased Matching Algorithm 
In this matching algorithm, the preference of the sailors is first 
taken into consideration when assigning jobs to sailors. When there is a 
conflict of choice, i.e. two or more sailors wanted the same job, the 
command preference is then used to decide which sailor gets the job. For 
example, if sailor #2 and #4 wanted job #5, and the command prefers 
sailor #2 to sailor #4, sailor #2 will be given the job. Sailor #4 will then 
has to move on to his or hers next preferred job. 
2. Command-Biased Matching Algorithm 
For the command-biased matching algorithm, the preference of the 
command is considered first. When there is a conflict of preference, the 
preference of the sailor will be used to decide which command gets the 
sailor, in the same manner as described above for sailor-biased matching 
algorithm. 
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IV.      FINDINGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After designing the economic experiments, the next step is to 
implement these experiments with a group of human subjects. Pre-tests 
were conducted to ensure that the instructions were clear and that the 
terms used made sense to the world of detailing. In addition, assistance 
from EPMAC was sought to ensure that the terms used fitted as closely 
as possible to the familiar terms to which detailers were exposed. 
The first round of experiments was conducted on a group of 
Logistics Management students at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
There were 18 officers in this group acting as detailers. The full range of 
4 separate exercises was conducted. 
The second round of experiments was conducted on a smaller 
group of actual detailers working in Millington, Tennessee with the 
assistance of Naval Personnel Research, Studies and Technology 
(NPRST). There were 6 detailers in this group. Due to the lack of time, 
only 2 exercises were conducted for this group. These consisted of 
matching 5 sailors to 8 jobs (with a batch size of 5) and matching 10 
sailors to 12 jobs (with a batch size of 10). 
B. RESPONSE DEMOGRAPHICS 
The first group of subjects consists of officers from the US and 
other countries. In addition, these officers come from the various 
branches of service (Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps). To ensure 
that officers from other countries (besides the US) understood the terms 
used in the experimental instructions, additional time was devoted to 
explain and clarify the instructions and the tasks expected of them. This 
varied and diverse group of officers brings with them their own unique 
experience with regards to detailing, having been detailed before at some 
41 
point in their career. It is also noted that none of them has had actual 
detailing experience. 
The second group of detailers consists of actual senior enlisted 
personnel working as detailers for the aviation community in Millington, 
Tennessee. They bring with them a whole depth of experience in the 
detailing world. 
C.       RESULTS 
1.       Results Of Exercise One: Matching 5 Sailors To 8 Jobs 
Using Batch Size Of 1 
The detailed results are presented in Appendix C and summarized 
in chart 1 below. This exercise was only performed on the first group of 
18 officers from NPS. 
Maximum Sailor Utility by Detailer: 19.05 
Minimum Sailor Utility by Detailer: 12.70 
Average Sailor Utility by Detailer: 16.41 
Standard Deviation: 1.777 




Average Percentage Improvement:     20.38%1 
It can be seen that the 2-sided matching algorithm results in a 
higher utility compared to that achieved by the human detailers. On 
average,   the   2-sided  matching  results   in  20.38%  improvement.   In 
1
 A simple null hypothesis test was conducted to check the statistical significance of the difference between 
sailors' utility by human detailers and computer matching (using the average utility from Command and 
Sailor biased Algorithm). Using a confidence level of 95%, the null hypothesis was rejected. The difference 
in sailors' utility is significant. 
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addition, there is tremendous variability in performance across human 
detailers. The quality of assignment might well depend on the individual 
that happens to be assigned as the detailer. 
2.       Results Of Exercise Two: Matching 5 Sailors To 8 Jobs 
Using Batch Size Of 5 
Two separate groups of subjects performed this experiment. The 
detailed results are reflected in Appendix C and summarized in chart 1. 
The summary is as follows: 
(1)      First group of 18 officers from NPS 
Maximum Sailor Utility by Detailer: 19.47 
Minimum Sailor Utility by Detailer: 12.85 
Average Sailor Utility by Detailer: 16.85 
Standard Deviation: 1.907 




Average Percentage Improvement:      18.26%2 
It can be seen that 2-sided matching results in a higher utility 
compared to the human detailers even when sailors arrive in batches. On 
average, the 2-sided matching results in 18.26% improvement over that 
achieved by human detailers. Furthermore, there is only a marginal 
improvement in average performance when the sailors are detailed in a 
batch vice first come, first served. 
2
 A simple null hypothesis test was conducted to check the statistical significance of the difference between 
sailors' utility by human detailers and computer matching (using the average utility from Command and 
Sailor biased Algorithm). Using a confidence level of 95%, the null hypothesis was rejected. The difference 
in sailors' utility is significant. 
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(2)      Second group of 6 detailers from Millington 
Maximum Sailor Utility by Detailer: 19.05 
Minimum Sailor Utility by Detailer: 12.80 
Average Sailor Utility by Detailer: 16.48 
Standard Deviation: 2.172 




Average Percentage improvement:     20.05 %3 
It can be seen that the 2-sided matching results in a higher utility 
compared to the human detailers. On average, the 2-sided matching 
results in 20.05 % improvement over that achieved by human detailers. 
The difference was only significant at 90% confidence level due to the 
large standard deviation of detailers' results. Interestingly, there is little 
difference in performance between the NPS students and the actual 
detailers. 
A simple null hypothesis test was conducted to check the statistical significance of the difference between 
sailors' utility by human detailers and computer matching (using the average utility from Command and 
Sailor biased Algorithm). Using a confidence level of 95%, the null hypothesis was NOT rejected. The 
difference in sailors' utility is not significant at this confidence level. If a 90% confidence level was chosen 
instead, the null hypothesis would have been rejected. 
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Chart 1: 
Total utility of 5 sailors 
♦ ■ ■ Batch Size 1 
■*—Batch Size 5 
Total Utility 
Detailer 1 to 18 : NPS students 
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3.       Results Of Exercise Three: Matching 10 Sailors To 12 
Jobs Using Batch Size Of 1 
The detailed results are presented in Appendix C and summarized 
in chart 2. This exercise was only performed on the first group of 18 
officers from NPS. 
Maximum Sailor Utility by Detailer: 33.91 
Minimum Sailor Utility by Detailer: 25.66 
Average Sailor Utility by Detailer: 29.55 
Standard Deviation: 2.277 
Sailor Utility derived from 2-Sided Matching: 
36.79 (Command and Sailor-biased) 
45 
Average Percentage Improvement:      19.66%4 
It can be seen that the 2-sided matching results in a higher utility 
compared to the human detailers. On average, the 2-sided matching 
results in 19.66% improvement over that achieved by human detailers. 
Again, there is tremendous variability across the human detailers. 
4.       Results Of Exercise Four:  Matching  10 Sailors To  12 
Jobs Using Batch Size Of 10 
(1)      First group of 18 officers from NPS 
Maximum Sailor Utility by Detailer: 34.04 
Minimum Sailor Utility by Detailer: 25.05 
Average Sailor Utility by Detailer: 30.07 
Standard Deviation: 2.412 
Sailor Utility derived from 2-Sided Matching: 
36.79 (Command and Sailor-biased) 
Average Percentage Improvement:      18.27 %5 
It can be seen that the 2-sided matching results in a higher utility 
compared to the human detailers. On average, the 2-sided matching 
results in 18.27% improvement over that achieved by human detailers. 
The results for batch size 10 still show tremendous variability across 
human detailers and only a slight improvement with a batch size of ten 
vice first come, first served. 
A simple null hypothesis test was conducted to check the statistical significance of the difference between 
sailors' utility by human detailers and computer matching (using the average utility from Command and 
Sailor biased Algorithm). Using a confidence level of 99%, the null hypothesis was rejected. The difference 
in sailors' utility is significant. 
5
 A simple null hypothesis test was conducted to check the statistical significance of the difference between 
sailors' utility by human detailers and computer matching (using the average utility from Command and 
Sailor biased Algorithm). Using a confidence level of 99%, the null hypothesis was rejected. The difference 
in sailors' utility is significant. 
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(2)      Second group of 6 detailers from Millington 
Maximum Sailor Utility by Detailer: 34.81 
Minimum Sailor Utility by Detailer: 29.54 
Average Sailor Utility by Detailer: 32.49 
Standard Deviation: 2.161 
Sailor Utility derived from 2-Sided Matching: 
36.79 (Command and Sailor-biased) 
Average Percentage Improvement:      11.67 %6 
It can be seen that the 2-sided matching results in a higher utility 
compared to the human detailers. On average, the 2-sided matching 
results in 11.67 % improvement over that achieved by human detailers. 
In this case, there was a more pronounced improvement between the 
actual detailers and NPS students. Further research is necessary to 
determine if detailers' performance continues to improve relative to 
students' performance as the detailing experiment becomes more 
complex. 
6
 A simple null hypothesis test was conducted to check the statistical significance of the difference between 
sailors' utility by human detailers and computer matching (using the average utility from Command and 
Sailor biased Algorithm). Using a confidence level of 95%, the null hypothesis was rejected. The difference 
in sailors' utility is significant. 
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Chart 2: 
Total utility of 10 Sailors 
■ Batch Size 1 
■Batch Size 10 
Total Utility 
Detailer 1 to 18 : NPS students 
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D.       ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
The following table shows the summary of findings that were 
conducted from the various economics experiments. 

































































Table 1: Summary of Findings 
*Figures in parenthesis denote results from detailers in Millington 
The figures indicate that the 2-sided matching algorithm produces 
a higher sailor utility every time. Even the "best" human detailer in each 
of the 4 exercises generates a utility that is lower than that from the 2- 
sided matching algorithm. The 2-sided matching algorithm is able to 
generate between 18-20% improvement in utility over that of the average 
human detailer. The difference is significant using at least 90% 
confidence level. 
2.       NPS Students And Actual Detailers From Millington 
There is also a distinct difference between the results obtained by 
the 2 separate groups. The NPS group did better in Ex #2 while the 
detailer group did better in Ex #4. The only difference between the 2 
exercises was the magnitude of sailors/billets involved (complexity). Ex 
#4 involved more sailors (10) and more jobs (12) while Ex #2 involved 
fewer sailors (5) and fewer jobs (8). A possible explanation could be that 
the detailers in Millington are used to dealing with a larger number of 
sailors and matching them to a large pool of available jobs, as part of 
their job. Hence they are better "conditioned" to handle sailors and jobs 
on a larger scale than the average NPS officers. This may help explain the 
fact that the average increase in sailor utility for Ex #4 for the detailers 
using the 2 sided matching algorithm is only 11% compared to the 
average 18-20% improvement in the other exercises. 
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3.       Batch Size 
Increasing the batch size also helps to improve the level of utility. 
Comparing the figures between Ex #1 and Ex #2, it is noted that the 
utility figures are higher in Ex #2 compared to Ex #1. Likewise, the utility 
figures are higher in Ex #4 compared to Ex #3. This is true at the 
aggregate level as a larger batch size results in higher utility. However, in 
examining the results in detail, it is seen that 8 detailers (out of 18) had 
lower sailor utility in the scenario with a larger batch size. Likewise for 
Ex #3 and Ex #4, 8 detailers (out of 18) had lower sailor utility in the 
scenario with a larger batch size. In particular, the minimum utility is 
lower as batch size increases from 1 to 10, in the case of Ex #3 and Ex 
#4. The minimum utility in this scenario drops by 2.41% as batch size is 


















size = 5) 













25.05 30.07 34.04 
Table 2: Comparing the effects of increasing batch size 
A possible explanation for some sailors being worse off could be 
that some detailers may make less than ideal detailing decisions when 
presented  with  more   candidates.  This   could  reflect   some   form  of 
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information overload, resulting in lower overall utility as compared to a 
smaller batch size. However, looking at the aggregate level of all 
detailers, the overall utility level increases as batch size increases. This is 
one huge advantage that an automated 2-sided matching algorithm has 
over that of human detailers. Human detailers have a limited capacity to 
cope with conflicting information. Though the average utility is higher for 
a larger batch size, some individual sailors may suffer because some 
human detailers make less than ideal detailing decisions. On the whole, 
all sailors are better off; however at the individual level, some sailors will 
be worse off. 
At the aggregate level, a larger batch size produces a higher utility. 
With a larger batch size, more flexibility is introduced into the system. 
Detailers now have more latitude to assign more available sailors to 
vacant jobs. Detailers can consider the sailors' preferences to a higher 
degree of accuracy and better match sailors to vacant jobs. However, 
when a simple null hypothesis test was conducted to check the statistical 
significance of the difference in utility derived from different batch sizes, 
the null hypothesis was not rejected. The difference in utility is therefore 
not significant. 
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4.       Total Command And Sailor Satisfaction 
Total 
Satisfaction 







Graph 1: Comparing Command and Sailor Satisfaction between 
Detailers and 2-sided matching algorithm 
In the above graph, the command satisfaction achieved from the 
detailers is consistently much higher than the sailor satisfaction 
achieved from the detailers. In many instances, detailers perform much 
better than the 2-sided matching algorithm with regards to maximizing 
command satisfaction. This indicates that the detailers place more 
emphasis on the commands' preferences relative to the sailors' 
preferences when assigning sailors to commands. This may be beneficial 
for the commands but this may over-penalize the sailors as sailor 
satisfaction suffers. 
On the other hand, the 2-sided matching algorithm produces a 
more balanced outcome, with the commands' satisfaction only at a 
slightly higher level than the sailors' satisfaction. In this outcome, even 
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though commands' satisfaction level is greater than sailors' satisfaction, 
the difference is only marginal. 
Total 
Satisfaction 
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Graph 2: Comparing total satisfaction between detailers and the 
matching algorithm 
The graph above shows the total satisfaction from both commands 
and sailors as a system. The strength of the 2-sided matching algorithm 
is clearly demonstrated as the total satisfaction achieved from the 
matching algorithm is higher than that achieved from the detailers. This 
ensures equity as both commands' and sailors' preferences are being 
considered and the matching algorithm seeks to consider total 
satisfaction. This eliminates the possibility of sub-optimization, where 
sailors' preferences have to give way to commands' preferences or vice 
versa. 
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E.       CONCLUSIONS 
These experiments serve to demonstrate the strengths of an 
automated 2-sided matching algorithm over the manual human detailing 
process. A higher average utility is achieved using the 2-sided matching. 
This is the case regardless of the batch size of the job applicants. An 
increase of 18-20% in sailor utility is achieved using the 2-sided 
matching process. 
The effects of increasing the batch size of job applicants is however 
mixed. The average utility figures show a slight increase, between 1 to 2 
%. The minimum utility figures show a stark contrast, between -2.4 and 
1.2 %. This implies that some detailers do a better job with a smaller 
batch size (utility decreases as batch size increases) as indicated by these 
data. The maximum utility shows a slight increase, between 1.71 to 2.59 
%. These mixed effects could be caused by information overload and 
added complexities as detailers try to mentally juggle the sailors' 
preferences within the large batch and match them to available jobs. 
The 2-sided matching algorithm also considers total satisfaction as 
a system and it gives a higher total satisfaction for both sailors and 
commands. This is clearly better than the results achieved from the 
human detailers where total satisfaction achieved as a system is lower; in 
many instances, sailors' preferences gave way to commands' preferences. 
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V.       CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The simple economics experiments demonstrate the superiority 
that a 2-sided matching algorithm has over that of manual detailing. 
Adopting the 2-sided matching process produces an overall higher utility 
on every count. On average, this yields 18-20% improvement in sailor 
utility compared to the manual detailing system. The advantages are 
even more evident with a larger batch size. Human beings have a limited 
capacity to handle and process information; hence, when faced with 
detailing a large number of sailors to a large number of jobs, the 
resultant job match may be less than ideal. 
On the other hand, an automated 2-sided matching process is 
better able to cope with the complexities and the increased information 
requirements than a human detailer. Subsequently more attributes can 
be added to fine-tune the preferences from both sailors and commands. 
This will lead to higher satisfaction and higher utility. 
In addition, the 2-sided matching algorithm is able to generate a 
higher total satisfaction as a system (for both sailors and commands). 
This reduces the possibility of sub-optimization where sailors' 
preferences have to give way to commands' preferences or vice versa. 
When the total satisfaction as a system is considered as a whole, greater 
efficiency and effectiveness is thus achieved. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DOD 
With a 2-sided matching process in place, a better job match will 
result. This will help to improve the level of satisfaction for both sailors 
and commands. With more satisfied sailors and commands, the working 
climate improves and ultimately this will translate into better retention 
figures for the DoD. 
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This automated 2-sided matching process also eliminates the 
subjectivities that are currently present in the detailing process. This 
ensures equity and fairness across board. 
C.  SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES 
This crude experimental model is only the beginning of a long 
process towards implementing a 2-sided matching algorithm in the DoD. 
The sample sizes used in this study are very small. Hence, the 
conclusions need to be further validated. More experiments need to be 
conducted, with larger sample sizes to make the results and findings 
more robust. 
In addition, these experiments could be conducted on more 
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APPENDIX B.  DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Navy Personnel Detailing Task 
Suan Jow Tan and Chee Meng Yeong 
Please wait for instructions. 
Print your name 
General 
You are acting as an enlisted personnel detailing specialist assigned to match a small group 
of sailors with jobs at several naval commands that need to be filled immediately. The Navy has a 
policy of first filling the needs of naval commands even though the specific job preferences of sailors 
are important. Also, you must make assignments on a first-come-first-served basis; that is, assign the 
sailors in the order of the batch in which they arrive. In this exercise, sailors are rotating from a sea 
job to a shore job and they are all in the range of paygrades from E4 to E6. 
Instructions 
There are 2 lists of jobs at several naval commands that need to be filled immediately from 2 
separate pools of sailors. One list has 8 jobs to be filled from a pool of 5 sailors and the other list has 
12 jobs to be filled from a pool of 10 sailors. The job lists and sailor pools have been randomly 
selected from a database including 2000 jobs and sailors. Consider sailors' preferences to the 
maximum extent practical without jeopardizing the needs of the naval commands. 
For each list of jobs vacancies, the assignment of sailors to jobs will be done in different 
batch sizes. For the first list of 8 vacancies, the batch sizes will be 1 and 5, and for the second list of 
12 vacancies, the batch sizes will be 1 and 10. For the batch size of 1 sailor, the information about 
each sailor will be flashed on the screen in sequence, and detailers assign sailors to jobs one at a 
time. For the larger batch size of 5 and 10 sailors, the information about sailors to be detailed will be 
given out on paper to the detailers in batches. Each batch of sailors has to be assigned a job before 
information about the next batch of sailors is given out. There will be 2 matching exercises for the list 
of 8 job vacancies and another 2 matching exercises for the list of 12 job vacancies, making a total of 
4 job matching exercises. A new form will be used for each job matching exercise. 
Please place your name on each form and turn it in when instructed to do so. 
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Jobs to be Filled 
Different skill sets and experiences are required to perform the wide variety of jobs. Some 
commands place greater premium on the level of NEC training and experience, while others may 
prefer sailors having a certain level of performance. They will rank their preference on the level of 
NEC of training and performance as high or low. The table below shows the other attributes that are 




Location: Paygrade: NEC Training Level: 
1: Low LANT CONUS 1:E4 1: No NEC 
2: Moderate LANT NON-CONUS 2:E5 2: General NEC 
3: Average PAC CONUS 3:E6 3: Equipment Operations NEC 
4: High PAC NON-CONUS 4: Equipment Maintenance NEC 
5: Excellent 
Explanatory Notes: 
a. Paygrade indicates the paygrade level (ranging from E4 to E6) that is pegged to the job. 
b. NEC Level refers to the Command preferred level of training and experience the incumbent 
possess before assuming the job. 
c. Promotion prospect indicates the likelihood of being promoted while on job or at the end of 
the tour. 
d. Location indicates the geographical location of the job posting. 
Sailors and Preferences 
Similarly, sailors will have their own preferences over certain jobs that are available. They will 
also rank their preference to maximize their own utility. They will rank their preference for choice of 
location for the next job and the job's promotion prospects. These preferences are expressed as high 
or low. The table below lists the attributes of the sailor that are crucial to the job-matching exercises. 








1: No NEC 
2: General NEC 
3:        Equipment 
Operations NEC 










1: Not Promote 
2: Promote 
3: Must promote 
4: Early Promote 
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Explanatory Notes: 
a. Paygrade refers to the current level of the sailor, ranging from E4 to E6. 
b. NEC Level refers to the level of training the sailor has received. 
c. Performance refers to the likelihood of the sailor being promoted, an indication of his 
performance on the job. 
d. Current area refers to the geographical location of the sailor. 
e. Preferred location refers to the desired geographical location of the sailor for his next job. 
Specific Order of Sailor Assignments 
Each job-matching exercise needs to be completed on a batch basis. This is to simulate the process 
that detailers go through as they job-match sailors to vacancies as and when the job openings arise 
and sailors become available. There are a total of 3 batch sizes for each of the two job-matching 
scenarios, making a total of 6 job-matching exercises. 
Job-Matching Scenario #1 (5 sailors, 8 jobs) 
a. Batch size = 1 (available sailors turn up 1 at a time) 
b. Batch size = 5 (available sailors turn up 5 at a time) 
Job-Matching Scenario #2 (10 sailors, 12 jobs) 
a. Batch size = 1 (available sailors turn up 1 at a time) 
b. Batch size = 10 (available sailors turn up 10 at a time) 
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QUESTIONNAIRE (TO BE FILLED IN AT THE END OF THE DETAILING EXERCISE) 
1- During this detailing exercise, what factors were considered most pertinent in 
your assignment? 
2. What is the ranking order of the factors that you used? (i.e. which factor did you 
look at first, followed by which other factor, and so on) 
What factors were not considered at all? Why not? 
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